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THE LONG WAR, THE FEDERAL COURTS, AND  
THE NECESSITY/LEGALITY PARADOX 
LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR 
By Benjamin Wittes. PENGUIN PRESS. 2008. 306 pp. $25.95. 
Reviewed by Stephen I. Vladeck * 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With an increasingly small number of exceptions, commenta-
tors from all points along of the political spectrum have found 
common cause in identifying a central critique of the counterter-
rorism policies of the Bush Administration: their unilateralism.1 
Whether one ascribes fault to the executive branch for not reach-
ing out to Congress; to Congress for not asserting itself and for 
thereby shirking its constitutional prerogative; or to both, the ar-
gument that “things would be different” if the political branches 
had acted in concert—and if the President had not claimed such 
an unprecedented degree of inherent constitutional authority—
 
*   Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law. An earlier 
version of this review was presented at the PrawfsFest junior faculty colloquium hosted by 
the University of Miami School of Law in December 2008, where it benefited from the 
comments of Charlton Copeland, Tommy Crocker, Ben Depoorter, Dave Fagundes, Jessie 
Hill, Chad Oldfather, Howard Wasserman, Lesley Wexler, Verity Winship, and especially 
Dan Markel. Thanks also to Nutan Patel and Maureen Roach for superlative research as-
sistance, and to Adeen Postar for her tireless assistance in tracking down sources. In the 
interests of full disclosure, I should note that I have played a recurring role on the legal 
team for Salim Hamdan in the Hamdan litigation, and also co-authored an amicus brief 
on behalf of a group of law professors (and in support of the petitioners) in Boumediene. 
Needless to say, the views expressed herein are mine alone. 
 1. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 205 (2007). 
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has taken on an unassailable (if not tautological) quality.2 Even 
proponents of broad executive power have recognized the irony of 
the Bush Administration’s aggressive approach, i.e., “that the 
president has now ended up with lesser powers than he would 
have had if [the administration] had made less extravagant, mo-
narchical claims.’”3 
Given this trend, Ben Wittes’s Law and the Long War might 
best be understood as the most sophisticated addition to this 
burgeoning literature to date.4 Wittes, an editorial writer for the 
Washington Post during much of the period he discusses,5 seizes 
on the argument that there would be far less legal uncertainty 
today had the Bush Administration sought—and had Congress 
provided—framework legislation governing issues ranging from 
the detention of “enemy combatants” to surveillance and even in-
terrogation.6 As Wittes notes in the opening pages of his volume, 
“The absence of the national legislature from some of the most 
significant policy discussions of our time has brought about dele-
terious consequences at a number of levels,”7 including constitu-
tional theory, sound policy, and, perhaps most significantly, pro-
grammatic legality.8 
Wittes’s book is not just a critique, though; it is also a call to 
action—a roadmap for where to go from here. And as Curtis 
Bradley has noted, “Unlike many commentators, he seems ge-
 
 2. One particularly telling example comes from Jack Goldsmith, the former Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel from Oc-
tober 2003 to June 2004. See id. 
 3. BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 355 (2008) (quoting 
Bruce Fein, Associate Deputy Attorney General during the Reagan Administration). 
 4. BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE 
OF TERROR (2008). 
 5. Indeed, although they cannot be attributed directly to Wittes, a common theme of 
the Post’s editorials during his tenure was the absence of meaningful congressional in-
volvement in counterterrorism policy. See, e.g., Editorial, Congress Awakens, WASH. POST, 
June 18, 2005, at A18; Editorial, A New Approach, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2003, at B6 (“One 
of the great problems with the legal response to 9/11 has been Congress’s unwillingness to 
do its job and write law. . . . By inaction, it has left the resolution of such issues to a dialo-
gue between the executive branch and the courts, one based on laws and precedents that 
simply are inadequate for an untraditional conflict against a shadowy, non-state enemy.”); 
see also Editorial, The Moussaoui Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at A14 (“Congress has 
sat on the sidelines far too long as important decisions were made concerning the legal 
response to 9/11.”). 
 6. See WITTES, supra note 4, at 182, 188, 255. 
 7. Id. at 10. 
 8. See id. at 10–11. 
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nuinely interested in moving past partisan politics and finding 
workable solutions.”9 To that end, there is much to commend in 
his discussion of how Congress might go about both conferring 
upon and limiting the authority the President claims on a host of 
controversial topics,10 and we would all do well to take his pro-
posals seriously. Thus, although much of what follows is particu-
larly critical of one chapter of Wittes’s analysis, it should go with-
out saying that his is an incredibly thoughtful and incisive book. 
Indeed, it is entirely because I hope its ideas will be widely dis-
seminated that I thought it necessary to register a dissent to a 
small—albeit significant—part of Wittes’s discussion. 
In particular, the discussion with which I disagree has to do 
with the courts. For, as dismayed as Wittes is with the perfor-
mance of both the legislative and executive branches, he also 
saves a significant amount of criticism for the role of the judi-
ciary—and the Supreme Court in particular—in the legal chal-
lenges arising out of the Bush Administration’s counterterrorism 
policies. Wittes devotes an entire chapter of his book to what he 
describes as “The Necessity and Impossibility of Judicial Re-
view”11—the idea that the courts do have a role to play, but a role 
far different from that which, in his view, they are on the verge of 
playing: 
Taken on their own, the Court’s pronouncements to date have been 
something less than dramatic. At the same time, they contain doc-
trinal seeds of a far more aggressive judicial posture—one that sev-
eral of the justices clearly regard as desirable. The Court, in other 
words, has loaded and cocked its gun, positioning itself for a verita-
ble sea change in the relationship between the federal branches in 
wartime. Yet it has skillfully done so without closing off any policy 
options for either the executive branch or the legislature in the short 
term. It has not actually pulled the trigger.12 
 
 9. Curtis A. Bradley, Terror and the Law: The Limits of Judicial Reasoning in the 
Post-9/11 World, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2008, at 132 (reviewing WITTES, supra note 4). 
 10. For example, Wittes proposes a framework detention statute modeled on civil 
commitment laws for “the dangerously mentally ill,” a framework interrogation statute 
modeled on placing accountability for specific interrogation methods in the sole hands of 
the President, and a series of amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act––
our current framework statute for non-criminal surveillance––centered on aggressive data 
mining. See WITTES, supra note 4, at 181–82, 213–14, 247–55. To be clear, I take issue 
with several aspects of each of these proposals. But I also think that, at least in these 
areas, our disagreements are more in implementation than in principle. 
 11. See id. at 103–30. 
 12. Id. at 104. Although his book was released one week after it was handed down, 
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Put another way, Wittes’s central critique of the courts is that 
they have at once done too much and not enough. Notwithstand-
ing the relatively soft steps that the courts have taken to date, he 
suggests that the judiciary has carved out a far more aggressive 
role for itself in reviewing decisions traditionally committed to 
the executive branch during wartime and that we risk either “pa-
ralyzing our response to terrorism or corrupting the judiciary” by 
putting the courts in a position where they are bound to enforce 
legal limits on military authority in all––or even most––cases.13 
Although he does not expressly draw the analogy, Wittes’s ar-
gument powerfully echoes Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu 
v. United States, which warned of the dangers of conflating mili-
tary necessity with legality: “A military commander may overstep 
the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we re-
view and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of 
the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and 
all that it creates will be in its own image.”14 Jackson’s dissent is 
more famous for the “loaded weapon” metaphor,15 but it is more 
important for this idea—that courts should not even review mili-
tary decisions during wartime justified solely on grounds of ne-
cessity, lest they approve them for the wrong reasons.16 Indeed, 
Jackson expressly refused to state an opinion on whether the mil-
itary lacked the power to exclude and detain Korematsu—he be-
lieved only that it wasn’t for the courts to say.17 And there is 
 
Wittes was writing shortly before the Supreme Court’s June 2008 decision in Boumediene 
v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). The Court in Boumediene concluded that the Constitu-
tion’s Suspension Clause does apply to the Guantánamo detainees and, thereby, invali-
dated section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006—which precluded access to ha-
beas corpus without, in the majority’s view, providing an adequate alternative remedy. Id. 
at 2262, 2274. I discuss Boumediene’s implications for Wittes’s analysis in more detail be-
low. See infra Part II.C. Wittes was also writing before the divided Fourth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, upholding the detention of a non-citizen as an enemy com-
batant within the territorial United States, 534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008). The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in December 2008, see Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 
680 (2008), although the case had not yet been scheduled for argument when this review 
went to print. 
 13. WITTES, supra note 4, at 122. 
 14. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 15. See id. (“[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it con-
forms to the Constitution . . . the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial 
discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The prin-
ciple then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can 
bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”). 
 16. See id. at 245–46. 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 248 (“The military reasonableness of these orders can only be de-
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much in common between his reasoning and Wittes’s fears of the 
potential implications of aggressive judicial review of military de-
cisionmaking.18 
Thus, although I enthusiastically agree with Wittes’s critique 
of Congress and the executive branch, it is with respect to the 
courts where we part company. In the review that follows, I sug-
gest that Wittes’s criticisms of the courts suffer from two flaws. 
First, as a descriptive matter, he unconvincingly dismisses (even 
while noting) a competing narrative of the role of the courts in the 
war on terrorism—as a model of judicial restraint, characterized 
by narrow holdings and implicit guidance to the political 
branches on how to avoid more serious confrontations.19 It is only 
when the political branches have rejected that guidance (and 
when the legal confrontations have become unavoidable) that the 
Court has asserted itself further—what we might think of as an 
“incrementalist” model of judicial review, pursuant to which the 
Court reaches difficult constitutional questions only when all oth-
er possible interpretive remedies have been exhausted.20 That the 
courts in general (and the Supreme Court, in particular) have 
otherwise not reached out to decide unnecessary questions and 
have rested their holdings on statutory grounds wherever possi-
ble is hardly evidence of undue judicial interference, or of the 
courts sitting on the edge of the precipice with which Wittes is so 
concerned.21 Wittes’s narrative may therefore not only be entirely 
speculative, but based on a future reality that is rather unlikely. 
If anything, my own view is that the Supreme Court has been 
too passive, missing opportunities to identify limits on the gov-
ernment’s authority in a number of cases of equal—or even great-
er—significance than the Guantánamo litigation. As I note in 
more detail below, there have been any number of terrorism-
related cases over the past seven years where the Court declined 
to review lower court decisions endorsing the government’s posi-
tion,22 denials that are curiously omitted from Wittes’s review. 
 
termined by military superiors.”); id. (“I do not suggest that the courts should have at-
tempted to interfere with the Army in carrying out its task.”). 
 18. See WITTES, supra note 4, at 103. 
 19. Id. at 112. 
 20. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the 
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1573–80 (2000). 
 21. See id. at 109. 
 22. Examples (in no particular order) include the el-Masri state-secrets case, see El-
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2009  12:30 PM 
898 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:893 
But whatever the merits of the argument that the courts have not 
been aggressive enough, it strikes me as entirely backwards to 
cast judicial restraint as symptomatic of creeping judicial aggres-
siveness.23 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, with regard to Wittes’s 
deeper concern about the role the courts are potentially set to 
play going forward,24 my own view is that Wittes’s critique is 
misplaced for the same reason that Justice Jackson was wrong in 
Korematsu—not in his criticism of the majority’s result, but in his 
suggestion that courts should not be in the business of reviewing 
military actions held out to be justified by “necessity” at all.25 
Jackson’s central thesis was that we must not conflate military 
necessity with legality,26 but whereas he thus argued for the 
courts to sidestep deciding such cases altogether,27 my own (per-
haps controversial) view is that the need to police such a line pro-
vides all the more reason for the courts to step in—to reinforce 
that a distinction does exist between the two, and that even the 
most necessary of actions might nonetheless be unlawful. 
If anything, having courts carefully demarcate the line between 
legality and necessity may force the relevant actors to have par-
ticularly strong justifications for crossing that line—a result I am 
not convinced we should discourage. If a particular action is suffi-
 
Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007); 
the second round of the Jose Padilla detention litigation, see Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 
(4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006); the NSA wiretapping controversy, see 
ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008); the scope 
of federal government’s power to detain “material witnesses,” see United States v. Awadal-
lah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1056 (2005); the sharp circuit split 
over the Justice Department’s authority to close “special interest” deportation hearings to 
the public, compare N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003), with Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th 
Cir. 2002); and a number of others. 
 23. Surprisingly, most of the reviews of Wittes’s book to date have either neglected his 
critique of the courts or have generally not found fault with it. See, e.g., Michael J. Glen-
non, Trying Terror: Two Books on How Our Legal System Is Adjusting to Terrorism, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 14, 2008, at BW4; Eric Posner, “Law and the Long War,” N.Y. POST, July 27, 
2008, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/07272008/postopinion/postopbooks/law-
and-the-long-war-121770.htm; Gabriel Schoenfeld, The Home-Front Battle Heats Up, 
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A11. The one exception is Bradley, who alludes to the “in-
crementalist” view I detail below. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 136. 
 24. See WITTES, supra note 4, at 104. 
 25. Compare WITTES, supra note 4, at 120–21, with Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 247–48 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 26. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 244–45. 
 27. See id. at 245–48. 
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ciently necessary to preserve the union, it should not matter 
whether or not it is legal.28 But to suggest that courts have no 
business reviewing conduct carried out under the rubric of mili-
tary necessity is to give such necessity prominence (if not perma-
nence) over the rule of law. Like Wittes, Justice Jackson thought 
this a necessary sacrifice to preserve the role of the courts in the 
long-term.29 I disagree. 
To unpack these points, I begin in Part II with a thorough re-
counting of Wittes’s critique of the courts, taking seriously both 
his narrative of the role the courts have played and his prescrip-
tion for the dangerous role he sees the courts as being on the 
verge of playing. Part I is thus heavy on quotations and light on 
analysis; my goal is simply to frame the discussion that follows as 
objectively as possible. 
In Part III, I offer an alternative narrative of the courts after 
September 11. Part III begins with the cases on which Wittes fo-
cuses and suggests how the decisions are actually models of 
sound judicial restraint, with the courts finding the narrowest 
grounds available for their decisions. Part III then recounts many 
of the terrorism-related cases that Wittes omits from his discus-
sion, where the Supreme Court left intact lower court decisions 
embracing the government’s position. As Part III explains, even if 
Wittes’s narrative of decisions like Hamdi,30 Rasul,31 and Ham-
dan32 is convincing, his focus on cases the Court has heard is 
skewed (and necessarily underinclusive),33 underselling the judi-
cial restraint often inherent in the Court’s denial of review. 
Wittes’s speculative critique of the role he fears the courts are set 
to play may well be undermined by the idea that the courts will 
 
 28. Indeed, as I note below, this is one reading—albeit not Wittes’s—of what Presi-
dent Lincoln meant in his July 4, 1861 message to Congress, where he responded to Chief 
Justice Taney’s decision in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 
9487), with his famous rhetorical question: “[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, 
and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” Abraham Lincoln, Mes-
sage to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 29. See Korematsu, 343 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 30. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 31. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 32. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 33. Wittes also leaves out the Court’s first decision in the Padilla litigation, where the 
Court ducked the merits of Padilla’s challenge to his detention as an “enemy combatant,” 
holding instead that he filed in the wrong court. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 
430 (2004). 
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stay out of the way whenever possible. Indeed, and perhaps even 
more tellingly, in all of the cases where the Court denied review, 
it thereby left intact lower court decisions favoring the govern-
ment’s position—including in Padilla II, where there was at least 
some suggestion that the government deliberately tried to avoid 
Supreme Court review of a favorable Fourth Circuit decision.34 
Finally, in Part IV, I turn to the deeper theme of Wittes’s criti-
que—that the aggressive role for the courts seemingly contem-
plated in the decisions thus far is actually dangerous. After revi-
siting the analogous argument made by Justice Jackson in 
Korematsu, I suggest that, like Jackson before him, Wittes would 
sacrifice too much in the short term for an entirely speculative 
payoff in the long term. The courts may fail to draw the proper 
distinction between what is necessary and what is legal—as the 
Supreme Court spectacularly failed to do in Korematsu35—but the 
critical point of Part IV is that this potential shortcoming is not a 
reason for the Court not to try. 
II.  THE WITTES NARRATIVE 
The framework for Wittes’s descriptive summary is his sugges-
tion that the Supreme Court’s decisions to date have operated on 
three layers: 
On the surface, the rhetorical and most politically immediate level, 
the decisions represented a harsh rebuke of the administration and 
an attempt to rein it in. Go down a layer to the practical substantive 
importance of the decisions, however, and that rebuke looks like 
something of a feint—less than initially meets the eye. But still a 
level below that, at the layer of the tectonic plates of the relationship 
between the branches, the decisions paradoxically portend far more 
than meets the eye. All of these layers are real; all operate at once. 
And to understand what judicial review in the war on terror has 
been so far, its simultaneous triviality and momentousness, one 
needs to understand all three.36 
 
 34. See Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that the govern-
ment’s conduct had “given rise to at least an appearance that the purpose of these actions 
may be to avoid consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court”). 
 35. See infra note 152 (discussing the coram nobis proceedings that led to the invali-
dation of the convictions in Korematsu and Hirabayashi). 
 36. WITTES, supra note 4, at 104–05. 
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Thus, before moving onto his broader critique of the role the 
courts are set to play going forward, I begin by recapping his view 
of what the courts have done so far. 
A. The Layers of Judicial Review and the Gathering Storm 
Wittes’s layers of judicial review are fairly easy to map onto the 
three Supreme Court decisions he discusses. Beginning from the 
top (the “harsh rebuke” layer): In Rasul, the government had ar-
gued that the federal courts had no authority to entertain habeas 
petitions filed by the Guantánamo detainees, a position on which 
it had prevailed in both the D.C. district court37 and the D.C. Cir-
cuit.38 Nevertheless, a 6-3 majority of the Court disagreed.39 Rely-
ing on the precedents providing that the federal habeas statute 
countenanced jurisdiction so long as the district court’s process 
could reach the detainee’s custodian,40 the Court held—over a spi-
rited dissent from Justice Scalia41—that the detainees’ habeas pe-
titions could proceed in the lower courts.42 
Although the Court’s decision the same day in Hamdi is a bit 
more  complicated,  it  was  similarly  cast  as  a “stinging rebuke” 
 
 37. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72–73 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 38. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003). After the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Al Odah, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Gherebi 
v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1304–05 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 39. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 40. See id. at 478–79. Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment, did not agree 
with the majority’s methodology, and instead focused his analysis on why the cases before 
the Court were distinguishable from Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), includ-
ing a detailed focus on the unique legal status of Guantánamo. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487–
88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 41. See id. at 488–506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 485 (majority opinion). In a maneuver that went (and remains) largely un-
noticed, the Court subsequently sent a clear message, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Gherebi, see supra note 38, that all Guantánamo habeas petitions were to pro-
ceed in the D.C. district court—and nowhere else. See Bush v. Gherebi, 542 U.S. 952 
(2004) (mem.). In its order “GVRing” (granting, vacating, and remanding) Gherebi two 
days after it decided all three of the terrorism cases on its docket, the Court did not refer-
ence its decision in Rasul; instead, it invoked its decision in Padilla, in which it had held 
that Padilla had filed his habeas petition in the wrong district court. See id. (citing Rums-
feld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)). On remand, the Ninth Circuit got the message, order-
ing that the petitions pending before it be transferred to Washington. See Gherebi v. Bush, 
374 F.3d 727, 739 (9th Cir. 2004). Although the order is not reported, the same result hap-
pened to Hamdan’s initial habeas petition, which had been filed in the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Washington. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570 
(2006). 
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to  the  Bush  Administration  when  it  was  decided.43 Indeed, all  
but  one  of  the  Justices  rejected  the  sweepingly  deferential  
Fourth  Circuit  opinion,  which  had  concluded that the govern-
ment, by simply offering an affidavit, had  provided  Hamdi—a 
U.S. citizen—with all the process to which he was due in chal-
lenging his designation as an “enemy combatant.”44 As Wittes 
notes, Hamdi thus rejected a proposition for which “[t]he admin-
istration fought tooth and nail,” i.e., “that an American citizen 
held domestically as an enemy combatant has no right to counsel 
and no right to respond to the factual assertions that justify his 
detention.”45 And it did so emphatically. As Justice O’Connor 
wrote: 
[T]he position that the courts must forgo any examination of the in-
dividual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader de-
tention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of sepa-
ration of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into 
a single branch of government. We have long since made clear that a 
state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to 
the rights of the Nation’s citizens. . . . Whatever power the United 
States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with 
other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it 
most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individ-
ual liberties are at stake.46 
Finally, in Hamdan,47 the Court struck down military tribunals 
established by President Bush pursuant to a November 2001 Mil-
itary Order.48 Specifically, the Court held that the tribunals ex-
ceeded the limits that Congress had created for such proceed-
ings—limits that the Court’s World War II-era decision in Ex 
parte Quirin49 had recognized.50 Although the Court also con-
cluded that Congress had been insufficiently clear in its attempt 
 
 43. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also Editorial, 
Reaffirming the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A26. 
 44. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 341–45 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 45. WITTES, supra note 4, at 105. 
 46. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535–36 (citation omitted). 
 47. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006). 
 48. See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Cer-
tain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 
U.S.C. § 801 (2006). 
 49. 317 U.S. 1, 9 (1942). 
 50. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591–93 & n.23. 
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to take away the Court’s jurisdiction to decide the case,51 the gra-
vamen of the decision was that the military commissions at 
Guantánamo could not go forward in their then-present form.52 
As importantly, the Court in Hamdan was unequivocal in holding 
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions––and its hu-
mane treatment and fair trial norms––applied to the conflict with 
Al-Qaeda.53 Like Hamdi and Rasul before it, Hamdan, as Wittes 
notes, thus “left the administration scrambling to alter its litigat-
ing positions, and . . . prompted changes in both law and adminis-
trative procedures.”54 
The middle layer is where things start getting a bit foggier. In 
Hamdi, for example, the government actually prevailed on sever-
al key points, including the (until-then contested) issue of wheth-
er the military conflict in Afghanistan was actually a “war” for 
constitutional purposes;55 and whether the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force (“AUMF”),56 enacted one week after September 
11, provided authority for the detention of U.S. citizens—at least 
those captured on the battlefield57—notwithstanding the Non-
Detention Act and its mandate that “[n]o citizen shall be impri-
soned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant 
to an Act of Congress.”58 
On these points, Justice Breyer turned out to be the swing vote, 
as he joined Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion,59 rather than 
the separate dissents penned by Justices Souter (who, along with 
Justice Ginsburg, thought that Congress had not authorized 
Hamdi’s detention)60 and Scalia (who, with Justice Stevens, 
 
 51. See id. at 572–84. 
 52. See id. at 611–12. This was also the central conclusion of Justice Kennedy, whose 
concurrence with most of Justice Stevens’s majority opinion formed the crucial fifth vote. 
See id. at 636–55 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 53. See id. at 629–31 (majority opinion); id. at 641–43 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part). 
 54. WITTES, supra note 4, at 105. 
 55. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–19 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 56. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
 57. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519. 
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Policy Comment, A Small 
Problem of Precedent: 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) and the Detention of U.S. Citizen “Enemy Com-
batants,” 112 YALE L.J. 961, 961 (2003). 
 59. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. 
 60. See id. at 539, 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2009  12:30 PM 
904 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:893 
thought that Congress could not, at least not without suspending 
habeas corpus).61 And although the Court had otherwise soundly 
rejected the government’s view of the content of Hamdi’s due 
process rights,62 the plurality still left a substantial amount of 
discretion to the government in fashioning a more appropriate 
process, providing only a few clues as to what would not be con-
stitutionally adequate.63 
More straightforwardly, Rasul and Hamdan were both effec-
tively statutory interpretation decisions, and therefore left open 
the possibility that Congress might (as it subsequently would) at-
tempt to override them, a point that both Justices Breyer and 
Kennedy drove home in their separate concurrences in Hamdan.64 
With the exception of a tantalizing footnote,65 the Rasul majority 
never even mentioned constitutional concerns; and Hamdan’s 
lone constitutional holding was that the President could not con-
travene otherwise valid congressional limits on his authority.66 
Thus, “the administration’s dramatic rhetorical setbacks in these 
cases amounted in practical terms merely to a few procedural 
hoops to jump through before doing as it wished.”67 
Finally, with what Wittes calls the “tectonic” layer,68 we begin 
to see the true outlines of his critique of the role of the courts to 
date. In his words: 
 
 61. See id. at 554, 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 62. See id. at 532–33 (plurality opinion). 
 63. See id. at 533–34. 
 64. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Noth-
ing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes 
necessary.”); id. at 636–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“[This] is a case where Con-
gress, in the proper exercise of its powers as an independent branch of government . . . has 
considered the subject of military tribunals and set limits on the President’s authority. 
Where a statute provides the conditions for the exercise of governmental power, its re-
quirements are the result of a deliberative and reflective process engaging both of the po-
litical branches.”). 
 65. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004) (“Petitioners’ allegations—that, 
although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United 
States, they have been held in executive detention for more than two years in territory 
subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without 
access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—unquestionably de-
scribe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006)). 
 66. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591–93 & n.23; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, 
the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 960–63 (2007) (summarizing the significance of this holding). 
 67. WITTES, supra note 4, at 108. 
 68.  Id. at 109. 
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The decisions seem to threaten a completely different judicial post-
ure in the war on terrorism, one that is a kind of mirror image of the 
executive power model the administration has adopted. . . . Under 
this vision, which clearly attracts the Court’s more liberal justices, 
the Court asserts the inherent authority to review executive military 
actions. It sets its own jurisdiction for such review without regard to 
the wishes of the two political branches or to the historical limits of 
judicial power. In the absence of clear substantive law to apply using 
that jurisdiction, the justices mold substantive rights for detainees 
out of international humanitarian-law principles the United States 
has either never embraced at all or never clearly implemented in its 
domestic statutes.69 
Thus, Wittes seizes on language in both Rasul and Hamdan 
where the Justices at least seemed to hint that more was going on 
than simply statutory interpretation.70 Similarly, he focuses par-
ticular emphasis on how the Hamdan Court construed the Detai-
nee Treatment Act of 200571 as not withdrawing its jurisdiction, 
making its own power a matter of statutory default and forcing Con-
gress to write it out of the picture if it chose—even as it held out the 
possibility that such legislation might be futile and that the Court 
would then fall back on a more fundamental legal basis for interven-
tion.72 
In short, Wittes sees the Court as speaking softly, but preparing 
to wield an unprecedented stick. Especially because the Bush 
Administration chose not to read between the lines, Wittes con-
cludes that a far more aggressive role for the courts was practical-
ly inevitable.73 
B. The Danger of Confusing Necessity with Legality 
At this point, Wittes finally delves into the trickier subject of 
why such “aggressive” review by the courts would be inappro-
priate.74 First, he suggests that the principle that would require 
judicial review of detention decisions is difficult to detach from 
one that would require judicial review of any lawsuit where 
“people abroad . . . might ascribe their misfortunes, real or im-
 
 69. Id.  
 70. See id. at 109–11. 
 71. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739–44 (codified as amended at 
10 U.S.C. § 801 note, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd and note (2006)). 
 72. WITTES, supra note 4, at 110–11. 
 73. See id. at 112–13. 
 74. See id. at 112–16. 
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agined, to American governmental behavior alleged to defy legal 
norms. Why is this area so different that jurisdiction unthinkable 
in those instances is constitutionally required here?”75 
Second, he also criticizes aggressive judicial review as being 
based on “an unrealistic assessment of judicial competence and 
capacity to evaluate military actions.”76 Judges in that position, 
he suspects, will either “defer absolutely to the military’s judg-
ment” or “will try to apply criminal justice evidentiary standards 
to combat operations.”77 Neither prospect, he suggests, is particu-
larly appealing.78 
Finally, he gets to the “deeper problem”—that “we don’t mean 
quite the same thing by ‘law’ here [in the context of international 
conflict] as we do in civilian contexts. The principles are fuzzier—
tinged with caveats that amount to ‘except when we really have 
to’ or ‘it’s different when our guys do it.’”79 Expressly invoking 
President Lincoln’s controversial suspension of habeas corpus at 
the outset of the Civil War (and his decision to ignore Chief Jus-
tice Taney’s rejection of that conduct in Ex parte Merryman80), 
Wittes suggests that “law can never fully regulate international 
conflict the way it regulates more civilized projects[,] and . . . the 
process of applying law to warfare changes law as much as it 
changes warfare.”81 Ultimately, then, Wittes’s central problem 
with aggressive judicial review is this lacuna: 
Necessity breeds exceptions, situations in which principled rules 
don’t apply because they can’t apply—unless, that is, the principle in 
question is the ugly one that the ends justify the means. Judges are 
exactly the wrong people to ask permission to break the rules, either 
because they will refuse (as Taney did) in situations in which the 
president cannot honor the refusal or because they will acquiesce to 
 
 75. Id. at 116. 
 76. Id. at 117. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 117–18. 
 80. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 146 (Taney, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 1861) 
(No. 9,487). 
 81. WITTES, supra note 4, at 120. For a more in-depth analysis of the complicated lay-
ers involved in Merryman, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, the 
Suspension Power, and the Insurrection Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 391, 397–408 (2007). Useful 
discussions of Merryman abound. For a short list, see id. at 392 n.3. 
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steps that the judiciary ought not permit and certainly ought not 
cloak in the respectability of law.82 
Of course, Wittes notes, such a possibility has not yet arisen in 
the war on terrorism.83 But for those, like Wittes, who believe 
that “[t]here is an honorable place for judicial silence,” the judi-
cial review that the Supreme Court appears to be contemplating 
in its rhetoric in Rasul, Hamdi, and Hamdan “risks obliterating 
its capacity for [such] silence.”84 
Curiously, though, after marching through arguments for why 
the courts should leave themselves room to stay out of particular 
cases, Wittes then turns to arguments for why aggressive judicial 
review is appropriate—if not abundantly necessary—to review 
the detentions at Guantánamo.85 Although he traces the need for 
review more to the defects in the established process than to the 
rights of the detainees, Wittes seems to agree that habeas corpus 
is an appropriate vehicle for reviewing the legality of detention 
simpliciter, at least once Congress has taken far more concrete 
steps to define both the substantive limits of the government’s de-
tention authority and the procedures appertaining to detention 
decisions.86 While courts should not make front-end policy on 
those points, Wittes suggests, they are the proper forum for back-
end review.87 
Given his rather substantial caveat, one wonders which cases 
Wittes is actually worried about having the courts review. He 
never says so expressly, but there is one particularly telling clue 
shortly after his invocation of Lincoln and Taney, where he asks 
the reader to “[c]onsider now the interrogations of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed and certain other high-value detainees.”88 Reading 
between the lines, a cynic might view Wittes’s critique of the 
courts as reflecting a specific concern that the judiciary might 
pass upon the legality of the interrogation methods deployed at 
Guantánamo and elsewhere, and that nothing good would come 
from such review whether the government’s conduct was legal, 
necessary, both, or neither. 
 
 82. WITTES, supra note 4, at 120–21. 
 83. See id. at 122. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 124–28. 
 86. See id. at 128–29. 
 87. See id. at 129. 
 88. Id. at 121. 
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C. Subsequent Developments: Boumediene and Kiyemba 
Finally, before turning to my own views, it is worth emphasiz-
ing that Wittes was (as I surely am) writing before several more 
recent developments, including in his case the Supreme Court’s 
June 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush,89 and the subsequent 
lower court decisions in the Guantánamo detention cases, espe-
cially those involving the Uighurs.90 
Wittes expected Boumediene—indeed, he even predicted both 
the result91 and the morass that the Court’s decision would leave 
in its wake.92 What he probably did not expect was that, so closely 
on the heels of Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit would decide, in the 
context of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) appeal 
under the Detainee Treatment Act,93 that a detainee fell outside 
the government’s detention authority;94 thus, the government ei-
ther had to transfer or release that detainee.95 Nor, I suspect, did 
he think a district court would then so quickly order the release 
into the United States of that detainee (and sixteen of his breth-
ren) in the context of a habeas petition (although that decision 
was reversed on appeal).96 For that matter, I suspect it may also 
have come as a surprise to Wittes that one of the more conserva-
tive members of the D.C. federal bench would take the lead in the 
post-Boumediene habeas litigation, ordering the release of a 
 
 89. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 90. See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 08-5424, 2009 WL 383618, at *8 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 
18, 2009) (reversing a district court decision that had ordered the release of seventeen 
Uighur detainees into the United States); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (overturning a Combatant Status Review Tribunal decision that the petitioner, an 
ethnic Uighur, was an enemy combatant). 
 91. See WITTES, supra note 4, at 111, 256–58. 
 92. See id. at 127–28. 
 93. That is, a suit Congress had provided for, rather than one that the Court held was 
constitutionally compelled. 
 94. Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Boumediene, in recognizing the 
availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction in the district courts, had effectively vitiated its 
jurisdiction to review CSRTs. See Bismullah v. Gates, No. 06-1197 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2009). 
But see Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275 (2008) (emphasizing that “both the DTA and the 
CSRT process remain intact”). 
 95. See Parhat, 532 F.3d at 836.  
 96. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34 (D.D.C. 2008), 
rev’d sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 08-5424, 2009 WL 383618, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 
2009).  
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number of detainees—including the lead plaintiff in Boume-
diene.97 
Although these developments were still unfolding as of this 
writing, they may validate parts of his descriptive summary of 
the pre-2008 Supreme Court decisions.98 On one reading, they 
suggest that the courts were in fact ready to play the more ag-
gressive role Wittes saw them waiting to play in Rasul, Hamdi, 
and Hamdan. But perhaps they were just the courts taking the 
last in a series of incremental steps: Rasul provided that the fed-
eral courts had jurisdiction;99 Boumediene provided that Congress 
could not take that jurisdiction away;100 Parhat provided that the 
Uighurs were not properly classified as “enemy combatants”;101 
and the district court’s decision in In re Guantanamo Bay Detai-
nee Litigation suggested that the appropriate remedy, if the gov-
ernment could not legally transfer the detainees to any other 
country, was release.102 Is this “aggressive” judicial review, or 
creeping incrementalism? To that question, I now turn. 
III.  A COMPETING NARRATIVE OF THE SUPREME COURT  
AFTER 9/11 
In this Part, I suggest another view of the Court’s terrorism ju-
risprudence—that the Court has taken a remarkably modest and 
incremental approach to its decision making in significant terror-
ism cases. I begin with the cases the Court has decided, before 
moving on to a point Wittes neglects: the significant terrorism 
cases in which the Court denied review. 
 
 97. See, e.g., el Gharani v. Bush, No. 05-429, 2009 WL 88056 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009); 
Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008). Judge Leon had previously held 
that there is “no viable legal theory” on which some of the same detainees could prevail in 
a habeas petition. See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d by 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), and abrogated by Hamden v. Gates, 565 F. 
Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 98. WITTES, supra note 4, at 110–13. 
 99. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480–81 (2004). 
 100. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262. 
 101. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 835–36 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 102. 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 
08-5424, 2009 WL 383618 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 2009). 
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A. The Supreme Court’s Incremental Decision Making 
One way to view the multiple layers Wittes identifies in the 
Supreme Court’s war-on-terrorism decisions is as a conversation 
between the Court and the political branches in several acts. Act I 
included the trio of 2004 decisions.103 There, the Court sent a very 
subtle message to the political branches, noting that (1) habeas 
corpus jurisdiction––and thus judicial review––would extend to 
Guantánamo; and (2) the process afforded Hamdi was not (and 
would not be) enough to satisfy the Constitution, without specify-
ing what process would suffice.104 Moreover, if one is willing to 
read between the lines, one can also find five votes against the 
government’s authority to detain Padilla as an enemy comba-
tant.105 However, the Court did not expressly say so, opting in-
stead to rely on a procedural technicality and to force Padilla to 
re-file his claims in South Carolina.106 
In a sense, the government appeared to receive part of the 
message sent in these cases. Just over one week after the deci-
sions were handed down, the Department of Defense announced 
that it was establishing CSRTs at Guantánamo to afford each of 
the detainees an individualized status determination.107 By the 
fall, the government had negotiated a release agreement with 
Hamdi, rather than pressing ahead with a minimum of evi-
dence.108 
But the government also pressed ahead with the military tri-
bunals established pursuant to President Bush’s November 2001 
 
 103. See supra notes 30–31, 33. 
 104. See WITTES, supra note 4, at 105.  
 105. In particular, four of the dissenters in Hamdi—Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, 
and Ginsburg—would presumably have reached a similar result on the merits in Padilla. 
And Justice Breyer, who joined Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi, joined in a 
key footnote to Justice Stevens’s Padilla dissent, which noted that, “Consistent with the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, I believe that the Non-Detention Act prohibits—and the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution does not authorize—the pro-
tracted, incommunicado detention of American citizens arrested in the United States.” 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 455, 464 n.8 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
 106. See id. at 451 (majority opinion). 
 107. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the 
Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
 108. See Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had Cap-
tured in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A15. 
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Military Order.109 Moreover, after the Court granted certiorari in 
Hamdan to review the legality of those efforts,110 Congress at-
tempted—albeit ineptly—to strip the Court of the power to so de-
cide via the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Detainee 
Treatment Act (“DTA”).111 In response, the Court in Hamdan held 
that the tribunals were inconsistent with limits that Congress 
had placed on the President’s authority, and that Congress’s at-
tempt to take away its jurisdiction to say so was insufficiently 
clear.112 
The Court, though, went further. In the key footnote noted 
above,113 Justice Stevens suggested that congressional limits on 
presidential power are presumptively enforceable (notwithstand-
ing the Bush Administration’s strenuous arguments to the con-
trary).114 And Justice Stevens held that Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions applies to the conflict with Al-Qaeda.115 He 
also concluded, in a part of the opinion where he was speaking for 
a plurality, that the offense with which Hamdan was charged—
conspiracy—was not recognized as triable by a military commis-
sion under the laws of war.116 Again, the decision left considerable 
room for the political branches to respond. But it also began to 
suggest, however implicitly, that there might be some limits on 
that discretion, including limits on Congress’s power over the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts; limits derived from Common Ar-
ticle 3; and limits on the substantive range of offenses jurisdiction 
over which Congress could bestow upon military tribunals.117 
Again, Congress responded, and again, it apparently received 
some—but not all—of the message. The Military Commissions 
 
 109. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004) rev’d by 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 110. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 546 U.S. 1002 (2005) (mem.). 
 111. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, § 1005(e) Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 
119 Stat. 2739, 2741–43 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)). The DTA was 
enacted less than six weeks after the cert. grant in Hamdan. See id.; Hamdan, 546 U.S. at 
1002. 
 112. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 113. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23. 
 115. See id. at 630–31; see also id. at 642–43 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (agree-
ing that Common Article 3 applies). 
 116. See id. at 600 (plurality opinion). 
 117. I briefly take up the extent to which the Constitution imposes substantive limits 
on military jurisdiction in Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo 
Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 172, 174–76, 178–80 (2008). 
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Act of 2006 (“MCA”) provided the substantive authority for mili-
tary commissions the Court found lacking in Hamdan, but did 
much more.118 It incorporated a sweeping definition of who could 
be tried by military commissions;119 a broad list of offenses over 
which such commissions would have jurisdiction (including con-
spiracy);120 a provision precluding the enforcement of any rights 
derived from the Geneva Conventions;121 and, most controversial-
ly, the jurisdiction-stripping provision the Court subsequently in-
validated in Boumediene.122 Thus, the Court finally had to answer 
the question it had assiduously avoided in the earlier cases—
whether the Guantánamo detainees actually have constitutional 
rights.123 Even then, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority in 
Boumediene held only that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause 
protects the detainees; the Court simply did not reach whether––
and to what extent––other constitutional provisions might ap-
ply.124 
Even in one case the Court sidestepped, it found a way to send 
a subtle message to the government. In his opinion concurring in 
the denial of certiorari after the proceedings on remand in Padil-
la, Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Stevens) was fairly clear that the Court would step back in if the 
government sought to re-detain Padilla as an enemy combatant 
 
 118. See Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 119. See 10 U.S.C. § 948c (giving commissions jurisdiction over “[a]ny alien unlawful 
enemy combatant”); § 948a(1)(A) (defining “unlawful enemy combatant”). 
 120. See § 950v(b)(28). 
 121. See Military Commissions Act § 5(a), 120 Stat. at 2631 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
2241 note (2006)). 
 122. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008). The 
MCA also includes another jurisdiction-stripping provision––codified at 10 U.S.C. § 
950j(b)––that purports to bar collateral habeas review of all military commission proceed-
ings. See Military Commissions Act § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2623 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b) 
(2006)). Although Boumediene calls the constitutionality of that provision into some doubt, 
see, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 117, at 181–82, the district courts confronted with that ques-
tion have thus far punted. See Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225, 234 (D.D.C. 2008); 
Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 123. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 
426, 430 (2004). 
 124. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262; see also Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 08-5424, 
2009 WL 383618, at *37 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 2009) (holding, notwithstanding Boumediene, 
that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not apply to Guantánamo). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2009  12:30 PM 
2009] THE LONG WAR 913 
once his criminal proceedings had terminated, directly invoking 
the Court’s authority to entertain “original” habeas petitions.125 
The point of the above summary is not to attempt an exhaus-
tive recounting of these decisions, but to only suggest that one 
could easily find in these cases judicial modesty, rather than ag-
gressiveness. The Court was willing to draw the line when it 
needed to be drawn, but each successive decision used only 
slightly stronger reasoning, leaving room for the political 
branches to attempt to avoid forcing the Court’s hand. In the end, 
one can hardly blame the Court if Congress and the executive 
branch failed to take heed. 
B. Cases Denied/Opportunities Missed 
In addition, as much as the Court’s decisions in Rasul, Hamdi, 
Hamdan, and Boumediene represented a repudiation of at least 
part of the government’s position, Wittes omits from his narrative 
the far greater number of cases where governmental counterter-
rorism policies were challenged, the government prevailed in the 
lower courts, and the Supreme Court denied review.126 Although 
it is axiomatic that denials of certiorari have no precedential val-
ue (and thus one cannot read too much into the decisions not to 
decide),127 the point of including these cases in the discussion is 
because one might have expected the Court—were it in favor of a 
more “aggressive” model of judicial review—to have left fewer of 
these decisions (and, a fortiori, the challenged governmental poli-
cies) intact. 
For example, well over a year before it decided Hamdi, Rasul, 
and Padilla, the Court was asked to resolve a circuit split over 
the constitutionality of the “Creppy Memo”—a directive adopted 
by the Chief Immigration Judge ten days after September 11 that 
ordered the closure to the public of all “special interest” removal 
proceedings without individualized case-by-case determina-
tions.128 The Sixth Circuit struck down the policy as violating the 
 
 125. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1063–64 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the denial of certiorari). 
 126. See supra note 22. 
 127. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (quoting United States v. Carv-
er, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)). 
 128. Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All Immigra-
tion Judges and Court Administrators (2001), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.find 
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First Amendment,129 whereas a divided panel for the Third Cir-
cuit disagreed, voting to uphold the rule.130 Notwithstanding the 
marked division of authority on a question of constitutional signi-
ficance, the Supreme Court refused to intervene, denying the pe-
tition for certiorari to review the Third Circuit’s decision.131 In a 
(seemingly) related case, the Court denied certiorari to review the 
proceedings before the Eleventh Circuit in the case of Mohamed 
Kamel Bellahouel.132 Bellahouel’s habeas petition challenging his 
immigration detention had been kept secret by the lower courts, 
which sealed not just the filings, but the entire docket.133 
During the period leading up to its decisions in Hamdi, Padil-
la, and Rasul, the Court also denied certiorari in three other sig-
nificant terrorism cases,134 including a divided D.C. Circuit deci-
sion over whether the names of post-September 11 detainees were 
the proper subject of a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) re-
quest;135 a Second Circuit decision adopting an expansive inter-
pretation of the government’s authority to detain material wit-
nesses;136 and the first-ever decision by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review, holding that the USA PATRIOT 
Act (“Patriot Act”)137 was constitutional in relaxing the standard 
 
law.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf. 
 129. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 130. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 204–05, 221 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
 131. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc.  v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003) (mem.) 
 132. See M.K.B. v. Warden, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004) (mem.). 
 133. See Dan Christensen, After 2 Years, Broward Man ID’d by Court, BROWARD DAILY 
BUS. REV., Mar. 31, 2004, at 1. 
 134. The Court also refused to hear an appeal from a Ninth Circuit decision dismissing 
for lack of standing an attempt to challenge the Guantánamo detentions by individuals 
with no relationship to the detainees. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1156 
(9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1031 (2003). 
 135. See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004). 
 136. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
543 U.S. 1056 (2005). The district court’s decision in Awadallah had created an internal 
division of authority within the Southern District of New York. Compare United States v. 
Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), with In re Application of the United 
States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 137. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 
115 Stat. 272, 291 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1823 (2006)). Before September 11, 
courts had read into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) a requirement that 
foreign intelligence surveillance be the “primary purpose” for obtaining the FISA warrant 
in order to mitigate potential Fourth Amendment concerns. See, e.g., United States v. 
Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 
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for whether evidence obtained through Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act (“FISA”) warrants could be used in criminal investi-
gations.138 There were others, as well, but until the Court granted 
certiorari in Rasul in November 2003, it was not clear whether 
the Court would ever get involved in the myriad challenges to the 
Bush Administration’s counterterrorism policies—hardly the 
mark of a Court seeking to carve out a new aggressive role for the 
judiciary.139 
After the Court’s first foray into counterterrorism issues in the 
2004 trilogy, the same pattern repeated itself. As noted above, the 
Court denied certiorari over three dissenting votes when Jose Pa-
dilla’s case came back up after remand,140 with Justice Kennedy 
(joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Stevens) explaining 
in a rare concurrence that Padilla’s intervening criminal indict-
ment (and transfer to civilian criminal custody in Miami) effec-
tively mooted his challenge to his military detention.141 The Court 
also denied certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s sweeping en-
dorsement of the state secrets privilege as precluding a damages 
suit arising out of the “extraordinary rendition” program,142 and it 
denied certiorari to review a fascinating Federal Circuit decision 
 
908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 138. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). Because proceed-
ings before the FISA Court of Review are non-adversarial, the ACLU first sought permis-
sion from the Supreme Court for leave to intervene for the purpose of filing a petition for 
certiorari, permission the Court denied. See ACLU v. United States, 538 U.S. 920 (2003) 
(mem.). The Court of Review thereby reversed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
which had published a decision for the first time earlier in 2002 adopting rigorous minimi-
zation procedures to avoid the question of whether the Patriot Act’s “significant purpose” 
amendment violated the Fourth Amendment. See In re All Matters Submitted to the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 625 (FISA Ct. 2002). More recent-
ly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon squarely disagreed with the FISA 
Court of Review, striking down the “significant purpose” provision on Fourth Amendment 
grounds in Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1042–43 (D. Or. 2007). But see 
In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105b of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 
F.3d 1004, 1011–12 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (reaffirming the “significant purpose” standard 
and recognizing a “foreign intelligence surveillance” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement). 
 139. See Rasul v. Bush, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003) (mem.). 
 140. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 
(2006). 
 141. See Padilla, 547 U.S. at 1062–64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of certi-
orari). Other judges were less sanguine about the propriety of the government’s transpa-
rent attempt to evade Supreme Court review. See Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583 (4th 
Cir. 2005). 
 142. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 373 (2007). 
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dismissing a takings claim arising out of the destruction of a Su-
danese pharmaceutical plant on the ground that the President 
had determined that the plant was “enemy property,” and that 
such a determination was not reviewable by the courts.143 
Notwithstanding a poignant dissent from the denial of rehear-
ing en banc by Judge Kozinski,144 the Court denied review of a 
Ninth Circuit decision affirming a criminal conviction for provid-
ing material support to a terrorist organization, even though the 
defendants had no opportunity to contest whether the organiza-
tion was in fact properly designated as such.145 The Court also re-
fused to review perhaps the most significant of the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s many decisions in the Zacarias Moussaoui proceedings,146 
where the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s holding 
that Moussaoui’s inability to directly examine potentially excul-
patory witnesses in the government’s custody warranted taking 
the death penalty off the table.147 The Court also sidestepped an 
opportunity to pass on the legality of the National Security Agen-
cy (“NSA”) wiretapping program, denying certiorari to review a 
divided Sixth Circuit decision that had dismissed a challenge to 
the program on standing grounds.148 Indeed, even in Boumediene, 
the Court initially denied certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit’s 
conclusion that the Suspension Clause did not “apply” to the 
 
 143. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1348–49, 1350, 
1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005). 
 144. See United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915, 915–22 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 145. See United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 
sub nom. Rahmani v. United States, 549 U.S. 1110 (2007). 
 146. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 456–57 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
544 U.S. 931 (2005). In another significant post-9/11 criminal case, the Court considered—
and denied—a petition for certiorari from a U.S. citizen who challenged his conviction for 
various terrorism-related offenses on grounds including that evidence was obtained based 
upon torture while he was in the custody of Saudi Arabia, and that various classified evi-
dence was admitted at trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights––all claims the 
Fourth Circuit rejected. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, No. 08-464, 2009 WL 425086 (Feb. 23, 2009).   
 147. See United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003), rev’d, 
382 F.3d 453, 482 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 148. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1334 
(2008). This came after the district court had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits. 
See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
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Guantánamo detainees,149 before reversing course and granting 
review almost three months later.150 
The above list is by no means exhaustive. And reasonable 
people will surely disagree about the propriety of review in each 
(if not all) of the decisions noted above. But to fully understand 
the role the Court has played (and contemplates that the federal 
courts will play going forward), it is worth noting the number of 
instances where the Court left lower court decisions favoring the 
government’s position intact. 
IV.  NECESSITY VS. LEGALITY:  THE SHADOW OF JUSTICE JACKSON 
Even if Wittes is correct—that notwithstanding the role the 
courts have played thus far, we can expect far more aggressive 
(and invasive) judicial review going forward—that still leaves the 
question of why such review should be discouraged. Thus, in this 
Part, I turn to the comparable argument made by Justice Jackson 
in Korematsu, and explain how the shortcomings in Jackson’s log-
ic largely undermine Wittes’s argument as well.151 
A. Jackson’s Dissent in Korematsu: The Legality/Necessity 
Paradox 
Recall that Justice Black’s opinion for the majority in Koremat-
su controversially sustained the conviction of Fred Korematsu—
an American citizen of Japanese descent—under an Act of Con-
gress that made it a crime to violate particular military orders, 
including the order mandating Korematsu’s exclusion from “Mili-
tary Area No. 1,” i.e., the West Coast.152 In reality, everyone knew 
 
 149. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 
1328–29 (2007). As in Padilla, Justices Stevens and Kennedy (but not the Chief Justice) 
wrote separately to explain their basis for denying review. See Boumediene, 549 U.S. at 
1328 (Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
 150. See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (mem.). 
 151. For as much as Wittes’s critique of judicial review matches up with the critique 
offered by Justice Jackson in his dissent in Korematsu, what is perhaps most surprising is 
that Wittes never even mentions Jackson, and only cites Korematsu once—as an example 
of exactly Jackson’s point, i.e., that the courts have erred in the past when failing to dis-
tinguish between legality and necessity. See WITTES, supra note 4, at 121 & 278 n.13. 
 152. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216–17 (1944). Korematsu’s convic-
tion was subsequently invalidated on a writ of coram nobis, after it became clear that the 
government had affirmatively misrepresented the military conditions leading to its asser-
tion that the exclusion orders were still “necessary” by mid-1943. See Korematsu v. United 
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that those subject to the exclusion order were sent to internment 
camps, and so in upholding Korematsu’s conviction (even while 
applying strict scrutiny), the Court would implicitly be upholding 
the camps. As it turns out, by the time the Court decided Kore-
matsu on December 18, 1944, the Roosevelt Administration had 
beaten it to the punch, announcing the day before that the camps 
were to be closed.153 
Given this fact, had the Court accomplished anything in sus-
taining Korematsu’s conviction? In Jackson’s view, it had, and 
nothing good.154 At the heart of his relatively short dissent is the 
idea that the Court had set a disastrous precedent by upholding 
an exclusion scheme based entirely on race.155 As he wrote: 
[I]f any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that 
guilt is personal and not inheritable. . . . [H]ere is an attempt to 
make an otherwise innocent act a crime merely because this prisoner 
is the son of parents as to whom he had no choice, and belongs to a 
race from which there is no way to resign.156 
Although Jackson thus suggested that he would invite the invali-
dation of such a law during peacetime, he was more circumspect 
about the propriety of such judicial review during wartime.157 
This was not a new theme for Justice Jackson. He had been 
puzzling over the dilemma of judicial review of the war power—
what he called “the Achilles Heel of our constitutional sys-
tem”158—since his tenure as Attorney General (before his eleva-
 
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984). It also now appears that the government 
made similar material misrepresentations to the Court in Korematsu’s key predecessor 
case––Hirabayashi v. United States. See 320 U.S. 81 (1943), vacated, Hirabayashi v. Unit-
ed States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Eric L. Muller, Hirabayashi: The Biggest Lie of 
the Greatest Generation (unpublished manuscript, Aug. 18, 2008), available at http://pap 
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1233682. Hirabayashi’s conviction was also later 
invalidated in a coram nobis proceeding. See Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 593–94. See gener-
ally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT CASES (1989) (documenting the coram nobis proceedings). 
 153. See Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1935 (2003). 
 154. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 243; see also John Q. Barrett, A Commander’s Power, a Civilian’s Reason: 
Justice Jackson’s Korematsu Dissent, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 59–61 (2005). 
 157. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243–44. 
 158. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, “The Achilles Heel” of the Constitution: Justice Jackson 
and the Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 455, 468. The metaphor comes from 
a draft concurrence in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) that Justice Jack-
son did not publish. See Hutchinson, supra at 467–68. 
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tion to the Supreme Court in 1941).159 And as Jack Goldsmith160 
and Dennis Hutchinson161 have separately noted, Jackson drafted 
opinions in the case of the Nazi saboteurs162 and in two of the oth-
er Japanese exclusion cases attempting to more fully state his 
views.163 For various reasons, he declined to publish those opi-
nions, but with Justice Black’s majority opinion in Korematsu, he 
could wait no longer.164 
Rejecting the idea that the exclusion orders could be upheld so 
long as they were “reasonable,” Jackson was adamant that the 
propriety of the order was not just a difficult question; it was one 
entirely beyond judicial competence: 
When an area is so beset that it must be put under military control 
at all, the paramount consideration is that its measures be success-
ful, rather than legal. The armed services must protect a society, not 
merely its Constitution. . . . Defense measures will not, and often 
should not, be held within the limits that bind civil authority in 
peace. No court can require such a commander in such circums-
tances to act as a reasonable man; he may be unreasonably cautious 
and exacting. Perhaps he should be. But a commander in temporari-
ly focusing the life of a community on defense is carrying out a mili-
tary program; he is not making law in the sense the courts know the 
term. He issues orders, and they may have a certain authority as 
military commands, although they may be very bad as constitutional 
law.165 
In other words, Jackson was arguing for a form of martial 
law—and for the courts to leave military decisions to military 
commanders.166 And, in a passage that reverberates quite force-
 
 159. See generally Barrett, supra note 156, at 68–70. 
 160. Jack Goldsmith, Justice Jackson’s Unpublished Opinion in Ex parte Quirin, 9 
GREEN BAG 2D 223, 223 (2006). 
 161. Hutchinson, supra note 158, at 456. 
 162. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1942). 
 163. The two other cases were Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 104, in which the Court sus-
tained the constitutionality of the West Coast curfew orders, and Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 
283, 303–04 (1944), decided the same day as Korematsu, in which the Court ordered the 
release of a 14-year-old Japanese-American girl whose loyalty was conceded by the gov-
ernment. 
 164. For the atmospherics, see generally Hutchinson, supra note 158, at 456–57. In 
particular, Hutchinson suggests that Jackson’s decision to take his views public were mo-
tivated at least in part by “the trampling of the Maginot Line he thought had been fixed in 
Hirabayashi”—that Jackson had been under the impression that he had foregone publish-
ing his views in the earlier cases in exchange for the Court going no further than what it 
had there sanctioned. See id. at 488. 
 165. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 166. See id. 
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fully today (especially vis-à-vis current debates over the state se-
crets privilege), Jackson noted: 
In the very nature of things, military decisions are not susceptible of 
intelligent judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evi-
dence, but are made on information that often would not be admissi-
ble and on assumptions that could not be proved. Information in 
support of an order could not be disclosed to courts without danger 
that it would reach the enemy. Neither can courts act on communi-
cations made in confidence. Hence courts can never have any real al-
ternative to accepting the mere declaration of the authority that is-
sued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military 
viewpoint.167 
Maintaining that discretion was the better part of valor, Jack-
son suggested that this dilemma counseled against judicial re-
view.168 He “would not lead people to rely on this Court for a re-
view that seems to me wholly delusive.”169 Instead, he concluded, 
“If the people ever let command of the war power fall into irres-
ponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power 
equal to its restraint.”170 So framed, Jackson’s dissent was (and 
remains) incredibly controversial—what Peter Irons has called “a 
curious kind of judicial schizophrenia.”171 Professor Hutchinson 
suggests, though, that it was emblematic of a choice between two 
equally unsatisfying alternatives: 
Jackson conceded after the war that his opinion in Korematsu, dis-
claiming power to review military orders, risked inviting the gov-
ernment to frustrate habeas corpus by simply declaring martial law 
and suspending the writ. But he was moved by what he viewed to be 
a graver possibility: that if he, and the Court, found the military or-
der constitutionally invalid, and consequently that “100 district 
courts” began granting relief to detainees, then the War Relocation 
Authority might refuse to comply with the courts’ orders. For Jack-
son, that would drive a stake through the heart of the rule of law. He 
thought the possibility hypothetical, if not likely, but he was not will-
ing to take the risk, either in Korematsu or in unforeseen cases in 
the future.172 
 
 167. Id. at 245. 
 168. As Professor Barrett has suggested, Jackson not only suggested that the courts 
were incompetent, but that “civilian judges never would presume to declare a wartime mil-
itary measure unconstitutional.” Barrett, supra note 156, at 62. 
 169. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. 
 171. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT CASES 332 (1983). 
 172. Hutchinson, supra note 158, at 489 (citation omitted). 
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Instead, Jackson “bet on the future,” assuming first “that the 
excesses of the executive branch will be self-curing once the 
emergency expires,” and second, that “as long as the judiciary 
withholds its formal approval of those excesses, the Constitution 
will remain intact.”173 
B. The Limits of Jackson’s Dissent—and of Wittes’s Argument 
As much as Jackson’s dissent has been celebrated for attacking 
the substance of Black’s majority decision, its argument against 
judicial involvement has been roundly criticized.174 In what be-
came the authoritative critique of Korematsu, Eugene Rostow de-
nounced Jackson’s opinion as “a fascinating and fantastic essay in 
nihilism.”175 Even Professor Hutchinson, among Jackson’s more 
sympathetic commentators, noted two obvious flaws: “some emer-
gencies may not be resolved quickly or clearly, and judicial ab-
stention may popularly and even formally be understood as tacit 
approval.”176 
These concerns are even more poignant when applied to 
Wittes’s work. Twice as much time has passed since Congress 
enacted the AUMF as that which elapsed between Pearl Harbor 
and V-E Day. Moreover, the war on terrorism has the potential to 
drag on for generations, which would turn temporary exercises of 
military necessity into permanent policy, a prospect Jackson him-
self railed against in a 1948 concurrence.177 
But I also think the risk runs deeper. Even if one takes Jack-
son’s logic at face value, it holds not just that the underlying mili-
tary conduct is unreviewable, but that the assertion of military 
necessity (as justifying the decision not to review the underlying 
conduct) is itself unreviewable. Just like recent scholarly debates 
over whether procedurally valid suspensions of habeas corpus are 
substantively reviewable by the courts (that is, whether the sus-
 
 173. Id. at 493. 
 174. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 156, at 65; Charles Fairman, Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 453 n.30 (1955).  
 175. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 
510 (1945). 
 176. Hutchinson, supra note 158, at 493. 
 177. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1948) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (“I cannot accept the argument that war powers last as long as the effects and 
consequences of war, for if so they are permanent—as permanent as the war debts.”). 
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pension of habeas corpus itself prevents the courts from passing 
upon the legality of the suspension),178 the underlying idea is that 
once the government makes a threshold procedural showing, 
there is nothing for the courts to do. What, then, would stop the 
government from invoking necessity even when the circums-
tances did not warrant such a claim? 
Moreover, even if one believes that suspensions are unreviewa-
ble, there is a critical difference between the Suspension Clause 
and the issue here: at least with regard to the former, there is a 
colorable claim that the Constitution itself ousts the courts from 
reviewing whether there is a “Case[ ] of Rebellion or Invasion 
[where] the public Safety may require” suspension––and even 
then, only for the duration of the suspension.179 In contrast, Jack-
son’s argument sounds purely in pragmatism—courts should not 
review whether military necessity exists because such review will 
lead either to the courts affirming an unlawful policy, or to the 
potential that the political branches will simply ignore a judicial 
decision invalidating such a policy.180 Like Jackson before him, 
Wittes seems to believe that the threat to liberty posed by judicial 
deference in that situation pales in comparison to the threat 
posed by judicial review. 
The problem is that such a belief is based on a series of as-
sumptions that Wittes does not attempt to prove. First, he as-
sumes that the executive branch would ignore a judicial decision 
invalidating action that might be justified by military necessi-
ty.181 While Jackson may arguably have had credible reason to 
fear such conduct (given his experience with both the Gold Clause 
Cases182 and the “switch in time”),183 a lot has changed in the past 
 
 178. Compare, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 577–78 (2004) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting), with Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 
359 (2006). If the entire point of suspending habeas corpus is to prevent judicial review, 
one might argue that it is circular to allow courts to first decide if the suspension is valid. 
Of course, that only begs the question of whether the suspension of habeas corpus autho-
rizes the underlying detention, or merely postpones the judicial review thereof. See, e.g., 
Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1533 (2007) (debating this question). 
 179. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 180. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Hut-
chinson, supra note 158, at 489. 
 181. See WITTES, supra note 4, at 111.  
 182. Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 
U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 183. See Hutchinson, supra note 158, at 489–90. 
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six-and-a-half decades, to the point where I, at least, cannot im-
agine a contemporary President possessing the political capital to 
squarely refuse to comply with a Supreme Court decision. But 
perhaps I am naïve.184 
Second, Wittes assumes that a judicial decision invalidating ac-
tion that might be justified by military necessity will therefore 
preclude the relevant government official from taking such ac-
tion.185 Of course, it will not; it merely will require that official to 
make the “moral” choice between doing what is legal and doing 
what he or she believes is “right.” Just as legality does not follow 
from necessity, illegality does not compel the conclusion that the 
particular conduct is unnecessary. I do not mean to devolve into 
metaphysics; there is a rich and deep literature on “states of ex-
ception” and I could not pretend to do anything here other than 
refer interested readers to more detailed discussions.186 Rather, I 
mean only to point out that this is a relevant consideration that 
Wittes’s critique overlooks. There may in fact be something to 
gain from requiring government officials to break the law in such 
extreme circumstances––and there is a lot to lose by not doing so. 
Finally, at a more basic level, there is history, to which we—
unlike Justice Jackson—are privy. The government affirmatively 
misled the Court in Korematsu, just as it apparently did in Hira-
bayashi, claiming military necessity where none truly existed.187 
Given this history—and any number of additional episodes—we 
cannot afford to have faith that the government would only 
choose to invoke Jackson’s “military necessity” exception to judi-
cial review in cases of urgent need, especially when the invocation 
itself is unreviewable. In the end, I think Wittes (like Jackson be-
fore him) is right to focus our attention on the potential dilemma 
that courts face in these cases. Their solution, however, would be 
significantly worse than the disease. 
 
 184. For an argument that the President could, in some cases, constitutionally act in 
such a manner, see William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1809–10 
(2008). 
 185. See generally WITTES, supra note 4, at 108–11 (discussing the problems associated 
with courts reviewing military decisions). 
 186. For just a smattering, see Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Vio-
lent Crises Always be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Jules Lobel, Emergency 
Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989); and Benedetto Fontana, 
Notes on Carl Schmitt and Marxism, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1515 (2000). 
 187. See Rostow, supra note 175, at 520–23. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court’s 
famous 1928 decision sustaining a criminal conviction based upon 
evidence obtained through a warrantless wiretap, Justice Bran-
deis rejected the argument that the wiretap could be justified as 
an exercise of law enforcement powers justified by necessity.188 In 
his words: 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty 
when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to free-
dom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-
minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understand-
ing.189 
As the story usually goes, Brandeis’s view of the constitutional-
ity of such warrantless wiretapping—or lack thereof—was subse-
quently vindicated when the Warren Court overruled Olmstead in 
Berger v. New York190 and Katz v. United States.191 Such conven-
tional wisdom, though, may well have been another casualty of 
September 11, given the Bush Administration’s own admission 
that it engaged in a systematic program of domestic warrantless 
wiretapping,192 a program that, even if constitutional, seems diffi-
cult to reconcile with the exclusivity provisions of FISA193—at 
least prior to the 2008 amendments thereto.194 
Putting the substance of Brandeis’s dissent aside (at least for 
the moment), the above-quoted passage may be the perfect epi-
graph to describe the Bush Administration’s conduct of the war 
on terrorism, which consists of policies that have been pursued by 
“men [and women] of zeal, well-meaning but without understand-
 
 188. 277 U.S. 438, 471, 479–80 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 189. Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 190. 388 U.S. 41, 50–51, 63–64 (1967). 
 191. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 192. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf. 
 193. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2006) (“[P]rocedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which elec-
tronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic commu-
nications may be conducted.”). 
 194. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified 
in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 50 U.S.C.). 
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ing.”195 Jane Mayer certainly thought so—her important recent 
book, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror 
Turned into a War on American Values,196 placed Brandeis’s sen-
timent right on the back cover, just above President Bush’s asser-
tion in his 2003 State of the Union address that “[o]ne by one, the 
terrorists are learning the meaning of American justice.”197 
Mayer’s book is significant here in another respect, as well, for 
it is the most thorough account yet of the government’s mistreat-
ment of detainees—and the role that senior governmental offi-
cials played in promulgating policies directly leading to that mi-
streatment. As Mayer’s account makes clear, even with the 
jousting over definitional semantics, there can no longer be any 
question that the U.S. government has tortured detainees in its 
custody during the war on terrorism.198 And as I suggested above, 
I suspect that it is the specter of courts reviewing torture claims 
that prompts the judicial review paradox of which Wittes is so 
concerned. 
One could argue, as Alice Ristroph (among others) has, that 
torture is a singularly bad example of a situation where courts 
should defer on whether torture is “necessary” to those with “ex-
pertise.”199 After all, as Ristroph notes, the real “experts” all seem 
to agree that torture is counterproductive.200 
Even if torture actually worked, and even if one accepted that 
the completely fantastical ticking-bomb hypothetical could actual-
ly happen someday,201 there would still be government officials 
claiming the need to use such extreme authority when it was not 
strictly necessary. That is Brandeis’s point: even the most well-
intentioned of officers will cloak in the guise of “necessity” actions 
that are neither necessary nor appropriate, which is exactly why 
 
 195. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 196. JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR 
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN VALUES (2008). 
 197. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 86 (Jan. 28, 2003). 
 198. See Scott Horton, Justice After Bush: Prosecuting an Outlaw Administration, 
HARPER’S MAG., Dec. 2008, at 49–50. 
 199. Alice Ristroph, Professors Strangelove, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 245, 250–51 (2008) (re-
viewing ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, 
AND THE COURTS (2008)); see also Thomas P. Crocker, Torture, with Apologies, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 569, 560–75 (2008) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra). 
 200. See Ristroph, supra note 199, at 247–49, 252–54 & nn.6–12. 
 201. See id. at 253.  
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judicial review is so essential.202 Otherwise, the rule of law be-
comes little more than the rule of men,203 and the courts become 
little more than rubber stamps for unreviewable (and ultimately 
unjustified) claims of necessity––like the government’s in Kore-
matsu. 
The great irony in all of this is Justice Jackson. Profoundly af-
fected by his experience as lead American prosecutor at the Nu-
remberg war crimes tribunal, where he witnessed firsthand the 
chaos and calamity that could ensue when courts stopped serving 
as a check on the tyranny of the majority,204 he became more cir-
cumspect later in his career about whether the courts should ever 
defer to executive claims of need, even while still worrying about 
whether they would. As he concluded his landmark concurrence 
in Youngstown:  
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered 
no technique for long preserving free government except that the Ex-
ecutive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary 
deliberations.  
Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of 
the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.205 
 
 
 202. For much more on the inherent dangers posed by arguments based upon “necessi-
ty,” see generally Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of Con-
stitutional Culture, 61 SMU L. REV. 221 (2008). 
 203. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 204. See generally Dennis J. Hutchinson, Justice Jackson and the Nuremberg Trials, 
1996 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 105. 
 205. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
